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Digest: People v. Nguyen
Meagan S. Tom
Opinion by Baxter, J. with George, C.J., Werdegard, J., Chin,
J., Moreno, J. and Corrigan, J. concurring. Dissenting Opinion
by Kennard, J.
Issue
Does the United States Constitution allow the use of prior
juvenile adjudication to increase sentences under the Three
Strikes law even though there is no right to a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings?
Facts
In an amended complaint, defendant Vince Vinhtuang
Nguyen was charged in December 2004 with four felony counts.1
For sentencing purposes, the amended complaint also alleged
that the defendant had a qualifying “prior felony conviction”
under the Three Strikes Law, a 1999 juvenile adjudication for
assault with a deadly weapon.2
Defendant pled no contest to one felony, possession of a
firearm by an ex-felon, and a misdemeanor, possession of a billy3
on March 2005 pursuant to a plea agreement.4 Defendant had
also waived his statutory right to a jury trial to determine
whether he had suffered a qualifying prior felony conviction, i.e.
the 1999 juvenile adjudication.5 The trial court decided that the
strike allegation was true based upon documentary evidence and
noted that the court file regarding the 1999 juvenile matter
indicated that defendant admitted to the violation.6

1 People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 949 (Cal. 2009). Defendant was charged with of
possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, possession of ammunition by an ex-felon,
possession of a billy, and possession of methamphetamine. Id. Defendant was also
charged with two misdemeanors: being under the influence of a controlled substance and
possession drug paraphernalia. Id.
2 Id.
3 Possession of a billy could be charged and/or convicted as either a felony or a
misdemeanor. Id. at n.3.
4 Id. at 949. In exchange for the guilty plea, the other counts were dismissed. Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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Defendant objected to the trial court’s use of the prior
juvenile proceeding as a strike in the current case, in violation of
his Sixth Amendment rights, since the juvenile adjudication had
no right to a jury trial.7 The trial court rejected this argument
and sentenced defendant to 16 months for the firearm possession
conviction, doubled to 32 months based upon the previous
qualifying strike.8
Defendant appealed, raising the Sixth Amendment
sentencing issue. In the first opinion, the Court of Appeal upheld
the trial court’s sentence, stating that while the Sixth
amendment forbids the use of contested juvenile adjudications
for enhanced sentencing in a subsequent adult offense, since the
defendant had admitted that he had committed the violation in
the juvenile case, the current sentence was not affected by the
lack of a jury trial.9 On rehearing, the Court of Appeal reversed,
stating that since minors tried for criminal offenses have no right
to jury trial, “the use of any juvenile adjudications as prior
convictions to enhance subsequent adult sentences is prohibited
by the Sixth Amendment.”10 The Supreme Court of California
granted review.
Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has established that an
adult criminal defendant has a general right under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to a jury trial finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that increases the sentence
for a felony conviction that goes beyond the maximum term
permitted by conviction of the charged offense alone.11 Apprendi
found that the Sixth Amendment adopted the common law
tradition that any fact that is crucial to the maximum
punishment for an offense is considered an “element” of the
offense and subject to the same requirements of proof beyond
reasonable doubt and a jury trial.12
Under California’s Three Strikes Law,13 the complaint
against a defendant can, for the purposes of sentencing
enhancement, charge that defendant had previously had a

Id.
Id. at 949–50.
9 Id. at 950.
10 Id. (emphasis in original).
11 Id. at 947 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Oregon v. Ice 129
S.Ct. 711 (2009); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004)).
12 Id. (citing Apprendi).
13 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)–(i), 1170.12(a)–(d) (West 2009).
7
8
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juvenile adjudication qualifying as a prior felony conviction.14
The Three Strikes Law statutorily affords an adult criminal
defendant the right to a jury trial whether he or she has suffered
an alleged conviction.15 Here, Defendant had waived his right to
a jury trial regarding the alleged conviction and the trial court
determined he had suffered a qualifying conviction based upon
documentary evidence.16 Under Apprendi, any fact “that allows
enhancement of an adult defendant’s maximum sentence for the
current offense must, unless the defendant waives his jury-trial
right, be determined by a jury in the current case.”17 The court
found that the statutory process under the Three Strikes Law
complies with the Apprendi rule.18
However, defendant argued that he qualifies for the prior
conviction exception19 under the Apprendi rule, stating that
regardless of the jury trial rights in the current case, the lack of
jury trial in the juvenile proceeding excludes all use of the
resulting adjudication to enhance sentencing in the current
case.20 The court rejected this argument, stating that Apprendi
does not preclude the sentence-enhancing use of a prior valid,
fair, and reliable adjudication against an adult felon, because the
defendants had all the constitutional protections afforded, even
though it does not include the right to jury trial in previous
juvenile adjudication.21 The court found it logically incompatible
to conclude that a constitutionally decided juvenile adjudication
that justified confinement of a juvenile, would be considered
“constitutionally inadequate” when used at a later date to

People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 948 (Cal. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 950 (emphasis in original).
18 Id. at 951.
19 The prior conviction exception arose out of a pre-Apprendi case, AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Id. In Almendarez-Torres, the court found
that the Constitution did not require treatment of prior convictions as an element of the
current criminal offense and therefore did not need to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. (citation omitted).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 953. The United States Supreme Court has previously held that minor
criminal defendants, who may be confined in a correctional institution are
constitutionally entitled to nearly all the same procedural rights and protections as adult
criminal defendants, except for the right to a jury trial. Id. (citations omitted). The Court
discusses McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the 1971 United States Supreme Court decision
which found that there was no constitutional jury trial right in juvenile proceedings,
stating that it reflected the concern that the introduction of juries would interfere too
greatly with the effort to deal with youthful offenders in a less formal and adversarial
setting, echoing society's preference for protective and rehabilitative proceedings instead.
Id. at 956 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971)).
14
15
16
17
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establish an individual’s recidivism in order to enhance adult
offense sentencing.22
The court further stated that all California Court of Appeal
panels have previously held that the issue of juvenile convictions
being used to enhance sentencing for adult offenses does not
violate the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, even
Since the juvenile
though there is no jury trial right.23
adjudication is being used to show the recidivism of the now
adult defendant the court found that it was a highly rational
basis for enhancing an adult’s sentence.24 The court stated that
recidivism after the juvenile adjudication was even more
compelling reason for enhancing sentencing, since he had been
previously found to have committed criminal conduct and did not
reform, despite the state’s previous interventions.25
The court also pointed out that the majority of federal
decisions and other states’ decisions have also reached a similar
conclusion after the Apprendi decision, determining that nonjury
juvenile adjudications can be used to enhance later adult
sentences, and its’ ruling is consistent with these other
decisions.26
Holding
The court held that the use of prior juvenile adjudication to
increase a defendant’s sentence under the Three Strikes law does
not violate the right to a jury trial.27
Dissent
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that under
California’s Three Strikes law that the existence of a prior
juvenile court adjudication of criminal conduct triggers increased
punishment.28 However, Justice Kennard interpreted Apprendi
to extend not only to the “fact” of the existence of a prior
adjudication, but also requiring a jury trial on the conduct that
led to that adjudication.29 Justice Kennard argued that the
majority’s reasoning would “open[] the door to wholesale evasion
or trivialization of the holding in Apprendi”30 and allow for

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 955.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 961.
Id.
Id. at 962.
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legislation to be enacted defining any sentence-increasing
circumstance for the current offence in terms of prior court
determinations or adjudication.31 Under this situation, a judge,
not a jury, would determine if a specific aggravating
circumstance had occurred, after which a jury would determine if
a trial judge had actually made that specific factual
determination; this was not the United States Supreme Court’s
intention in Apprendi.32
Justice Kennard also felt the decision of the court conflicted
with its’ recent decision in People v. Towne, where it was held
that a defendant’s sentence may not be increased based on a
prior determination, in a nonjury revocation proceeding, of a
probation or parole violation.33 The implied view in Towne,
according to Justice Kennard, is that the constitutional right to a
jury trial extends to both the conduct leading to the nonjury
adjudication, not only the existence of it.34
Justice Kennard also found that the lack of the right to a
jury trial in juvenile proceedings, which the majority reasons
could be constitutionally used in sentencing because they have
been “reliably adjudicated in proceedings that included . . . every
substantial safeguard . . . except the right to jury trial”35
troubling. It is the problem of having the facts of a juvenile court
adjudication being determined by “a single employee of the
state”36 rather than abiding by “the system envisioned by a
Constitution that guarantees trial by jury.”37
Legal Significance
This ruling places California with the majority of other
states and federal decisions, finding that juvenile adjudication
could be used to enhance adult sentencing despite the denial of a
right to a jury trial during the juvenile adjudication. This ruling
further affirms and situates the Apprendi rule within the current
sentencing practices of the Three Strikes Law. Nguyen also
clarifies that in regards to sentencing, the right to a jury trial
when determining an aggravating factors is required unless the
defendant waives that right.

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id.
Id. (summarizing People v. Towne, 44 Cal.4th 63 (Cal. 2008)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Apprendi).
Id. (citing Apprendi) (emphasis added by Kennard, J.).
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